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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
Cross-Appellant, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, 
Defendants 
Appellants, 
Cross-Respondents 
Case No. 88-0201 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
and RESPONDENT 
THE PLAINTIFF, CROSS-APPELLANT and RESPONDENT, BRIAN M. 
BARNARD, by and through his counsel, the UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
through C. Dane Nolan and Brian M. Barnard, submits the 
following BRIEF in support of his cross-appeal and in 
response to the appellate brief of the defendants STEPHEN 
HUTCHINSON and the UTAH STATE BAR. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction in this court is based upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (3) (1953 as amended). 
The trial court resolved the matter by a summary 
judgment dated May 9, 1988 in favor of the plaintiff. (See 
Appendix) Defendants1 notice of appeal and plaintiff's 
notice of cross-appeal were both dated and filed May 18, 
1988. (See Appendix) 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a cross-appeal from a decision by the Hon. 
Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Utah, granting declaratory and injunctive 
relief to the plaintiff under the Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended), and the Utah Public and 
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-2 et seq (1953 
as amended), but denying attorney fees and denying exemplary 
damages. 
Defendants appealed from the granting of relief and the 
order requiring compliance and disclosure under the applica-
ble statutes. 
Plaintiff has cross-appealed the denial of attorney 
fees and exemplary damages. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1) The application of the Archives and 
Records Services and Information Practices 
Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as 
amended)) to the UTAH STATE BAR. 
(2) The application of the Public and 
Private Writings Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§78-26-1 
et seq (1953 as amended)) to the UTAH STATE 
BAR. 
(3) Awards of attorney fees under the 
Archives and Records Services and Information 
Practices Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et 
seq (1953 as amended)). 
(4) Awards of exemplary damages under 
the Archives and Records Services and Infor-
mation Practices Act (Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended)). 
(5) Application of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutes are the Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended), and the Public and 
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 
as amended), as interpreted by Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1980). 
The issue of attorney fees is addressed by Ut. Code 
Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended). The issue of exempla-
ry damages is addressed by Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953 
as amended). 
The UTAH STATE BAR was created in 1931 by state law, 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and 
perpetuated and re-created in 1981 by this Court (Rules for 
Integration and Management of the UTAH STATE BAR, adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981). 
The Rules and Regulations of the UTAH STATE BAR, as 
adopted and approved by this Court, make no provision for 
the non-disclosure of the information requested. 
Rule 11 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure establish procedures for raising claims of frivolous 
lawsuits and appropriate sanctions, as well as striking 
frivolous defenses and scandalous matters. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As a state agency, the UTAH STATE BAR is required to 
comply with the Archives and Records Services and Informa-
tion Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq. (1953 
as amended), and the Public and Private Writings Act, Ut. 
Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended), as interpret-
ed by Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980). The 
defendants declined to do so and refused to provide the 
plaintiff with the amount of salaries paid to employees of 
the UTAH STATE BAR. 
The plaintiff sued to get the information. The defen-
dants answered refusing to provide the information and 
claimed the statutes did not apply to them and alleged that 
plaintiff improperly and unethically filed his lawsuit. The 
trial court found merit in the action, agreed with the 
plaintiff's contentions and granted the relief sought. 
Defendants appealed that decision. 
The trial court also declined to award attorney fees 
and exemplary damages. The plaintiff cross-appealed those 
rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. BRIAN M. BARNARD is an adult citizen and resident 
of the State of Utah and an attorney admitted to practice 
before this Court. He maintains an office at 214 East Fifth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. (T.R. 22; Plaintiff's 
Aff. 1 1) 
2. The UTAH STATE BAR is a governmental entity created 
as an administrative agency of the Utah Supreme Court for 
the purposes, among other things, of supervising the conduct 
of attorneys in the State of Utah and serving the legal 
profession in the State of Utah. The UTAH STATE BAR, as a 
governmental entity, was created in 1931 by state law, Ut. 
Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and perpetii-
ated and re-created in 1981 by an administrative rule of 
this Court (Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH 
STATE BAR, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 
1, 1981). Suit against the UTAH STATE BAR is authorized by 
Rule (A) 1. of those Rules. (T.R. 143-146) 
3. STEPHEN HUTCHINSON is the Executive Director of the 
UTAH STATE BAR, and was selected and employed by the UTAH 
STATE BAR Commission to manage and handle the day-to-day 
executive duties of the UTAH STATE BAR and is the agent, 
servant and employee of the UTAH STATE BAR. At all times 
pertinent to this action STEPHEN HUTCHINSON was acting under 
the direct supervision of the Board of Commissioners of the 
UTAH STATE BAR. At all times pertinent to this action 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON had the duty and responsibility of 
enforcing the policies of the UTAH STATE BAR with regard to 
the policies of the defendants. (T.R. 48; Answer, 1 II) 
4. The plaintiff, BRIAN M. BARNARD, has been a dues 
paying member of the UTAH STATE BAR in good standing since 
1971. (T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 2) 
5. The plaintiff, BRIAN M. BARNARD, is required, in 
order to be a member of the UTAH STATE BAR and to practice 
law in the State of Utah, to pay certain dues to the UTAH 
STATE BAR. (T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 3) 
6. The plaintiff's paid mandatory dues, along with the 
dues of all other members of the UTAH STATE BAR, are used to 
pay the wages and salaries of executives, administrators and 
employees of the UTAH STATE BAR. (T.R. 23; Plaintiff's Aff. 
1 4) 
7. The plaintiff mailed a letter to STEPHEN 
HUTCHINSON, dated November 6, 1987, inquiring as to the 
wages, salaries and benefits paid to certain employees of 
the UTAH STATE BAR. A copy of that letter is attached to 
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "L". (T.R. 23; 
Plaintiff's Aff. 15) (See Appendix) 
8. The defendant STEPHEN HUTCHINSON in a letter to 
plaintiff, dated December 9, 1987, responded to the plain-
tiff's letter by declining to provide specific information 
as to the wages, salaries and benefits paid to employees of 
the UTAH STATE BAR. A copy of that letter is attached to 
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "M". Hutchinson 
provided only salary ranges paid to "Executives," "Adminis-
trators" and "Support Staff." (T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. If 
6) 
9. The plaintiff wrote a follow-up letter dated 
December 11, 1987 (a copy of that letter is attached to 
plaintiff's complaint and marked Exhibit "N-l"), to the 
defendants again requesting specific salary information and 
referring to similar information that was provided to the 
plaintiff in 1980 (See Exhibit "N-2" and "N-3" attached to 
plaintiff's complaint.) (T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 7) 
(See Appendix) 
10. The defendant, STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, responded to 
the plaintiff's follow-up inquiry of December 11, 1987 by a 
letter again declining to provide plaintiff with the specif-
ic information requested. Exhibit "0" attached to plain-
tiff's complaint. (T.R. 24; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 8). 
11. The defendants in their Answer to plaintiff's 
Complaint, Fifth Affirmative Defense (T.R. pp. 49-50) 
recite: 
Plaintiff has brought this action for 
the purpose of harassing the Defendants 
in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
No facts have been presented to support such a claim. (T.R. 
passim). That claim is without merit and was improperly 
raised as a defense. That claim should be striken as 
impertinent and scandalous and as improperly asserted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a state agency, the UTAH STATE BAR must comply with 
the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and 
§§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended) regarding wage and 
salary information of its employees. Those statutes do not 
unconstitutionally infringe on the functioning of the UTAH 
STATE BAR. 
No rules of the UTAH STATE BAR or this Court prohibit 
release of the information. 
The plaintiff, as a member of the legal profession and 
the public, is entitled to declaratory relief and permanent 
injunctive relief against the defendants, requiring compli-
ance and the disclosure of salary information of UTAH STATE 
BAR employees. 
The plaintiff should be awarded, pursuant to Ut. Code 
Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended), exemplary damages for 
the defendants1 willful violation of Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended). The plaintiff must be 
awarded attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of Ut. Code 
Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended). 
The Fifth Affirmative Defense of the defendants should 
be striken as impertinent and scandalous in addition to 
being an insufficient defense. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
A summary judgment is mandated when no material issues 
of fact are in dispute and the case involves solely 
questions of law. Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. This case was properly resolved by the lower Court 
upon an application of law to uncontested and undisputed 
facts. 
The controlling judicial authority in this case is 
Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980). That case 
involved a request for salary information regarding employ-
ees of Weber State College by an editor of the college 
newspaper. This Court ruled that members of the tax paying 
public were entitled to access to salary information regard-
ing such government employees. The same interpretation and 
result is required in this case. 
I. 
THE UTAH STATE BAR IS 
A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. 
The UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency and governmental 
entity created by statute and/or by rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended); Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH 
STATE BAR, adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 
1, 1981. The statute creating the UTAH STATE BAR and the 
Utah Supreme Court Rules creating the UTAH STATE BAR speak 
as to the nature of the Bar. * 
Whatever it is, the UTAH STATE BAR is involuntary in 
its membership requirement as a result of judicial and 
legislative action. The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Legislature make membership in the UTAH STATE BAR compulsory 
for anyone wishing to practice law in Utah. (Rules for 
Integration, (A) § 1 & § 3; (C) § 20, July 1, 1981; Ut. Code 
Ann. § 78-51-25 (1953 as amended). 
* An interesting and thorough academic study, funded by the 
American Bar Foundation, on the nature of integrated or 
unified state bars is found in their research journal ("The 
Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept," American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal, 1983, Vol. 1, pp. 1-108). That 
article considers the three conflicting, incoherent and 
chameleon-like natures of unified bars -- public agency vs. 
compulsory membership organization vs. private voluntary 
association. The article concludes that unified bars should 
be terminated in favor of a combination of private voluntary 
state bar associations and administrative agencies indepen-
dent of the organized bar. "Perceived as the equivalent of 
a private voluntary association, a state bar has a strong 
claim to freedom from government intervention. Yet as a 
public agency a state bar must be held accountable for its 
actions to the public at large. And as a compulsory member-
ship organization it is also subject to external scrutiny, 
but scrutiny on behalf of its own captive members rather 
than the broader public." Id., 108. 
Defendants, in passing, characterize the UTAH STATE BAR 
in four (4) different manners: -- a non-profit unincor-
porated organization (Defendants' Brief, p. 3; p. 6); --a 
private organization (Defendants1 Brief, p. 4; p. 6; p. 10) 
an arm of the Supreme Court, an arm of the judiciary 
(Defendants1 Brief, p. 11; p. 14); and, -- an unincor-
porated association (Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, If 4; T.R. 
105). Defendants make no attempt to reconcile the conflict-
ing nature of unified bars or the differing obligations 
dependent on the characterization. 
All of the powers granted to the UTAH STATE BAR come 
either from the state legislature or from the state judicia 
ry. Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended); 
Rules for Integration and Management of the UTAH STATE BAR, 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1981). 
Thus, the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency. 
The UTAH STATE BAR has governmental powers including 
the delegated power to ntax" attorneys by way of annual 
dues, and the power to regulate the legal profession. Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-51-21 (1953 as amended); Rules of Inte-
gration, (A) § 1; (C) § 16, July 1, 1981. Those powers do 
not come from some voluntary association of lawyers. The 
UTAH STATE BAR is an adjunct and agent of the Utah Supreme 
Court. The UTAH STATE BAR is granted the power to regulate 
and prohibit the practice of law through admission and 
discipline of attorneys, a governmental power. 
The UTAH STATE BAR cannot exercise powers (and has no 
powers) beyond those which were granted to it either by the 
Legislature or the Supreme Court.** 
** The UTAH STATE BAR is apparently performing functions 
beyond the supervision of the Utah Supreme Court and not 
authorized by this Court; (Defendants1 Brief, p. 4; p. 7; 
T.R. 102-103); engaging "in numerous other activities not 
connected with the admission or discipline of Bar members 
which are not in any way governed, regulated or supervised 
by the supreme court. These activities include the 
semi-annual Bar meetings, various educational courses and 
seminars, a Newsletter and the Law and Justice Center in 
Salt Lake City.n (T.R. 102-103; Aff. of Hutchinson, April 
14, 1988, f 6, pp. 2-3) By exceeding its authority, the 
UTAH STATE BAR does not somehow gain powers beyond those 
legally granted to it, and does not become a private group 
not accountable to its members and the public. 
The UTAH STATE BAR has no independent existence as a 
"corporation" or "partnership" other than as created by the 
Supreme Court and the Legislature. The UTAH STATE BAR makes 
regular fiscal reports to the Utah Supreme Court. (Supp. 
T.R. ; Sec. Aff. of Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, pp. 
3-4, 1 2 - 1 3). All activities of the UTAH STATE BAR are 
under the direct control and direction of the Utah Supreme 
Court; according to defendant Stephen Hutchinson "the Bar, 
in all its activities and functions, is under the Court's 
direction and control. . . . As to all activities, . . . 
the Court retains ultimate control. It is my understanding 
that the Utah Supreme Court could at any time exercise its 
authority and terminate any specific activity of the Bar or 
terminate the existence of the Bar itself. I consider the 
Utah State Bar to be competely subservient to and account-
able to the Utah Supreme Court." (Supp. T.R. ; Sec. 
Aff. of Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, p. 4, % 3). 
Although the UTAH STATE BAR can own real property, can 
be sued and can sue and has other powers (Defendants1 Brief, 
p. 6), the defendants cite no authority for their suggestion 
that this makes the UTAH STATE BAR a non-state agency. 
Similarly, although the UTAH STATE BAR may pay property 
taxes and its employees may not be considered employees of 
the State of Utah, defendants cite no authority for their 
belief that this makes the UTAH STATE BAR a non-state 
agency. (Defendants1 Brief, p. 7), 
The UTAH STATE BAR is not a public corporation like the 
Utah Technology Finance Corporation, and the decision 
involving the Finance Corporation, (Utah Technology Finance 
Corporation v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), is not 
applicable to the case at bar (Defendants' Brief, p. 8); 
further, and contrary to the defendants' assertion, that 
case did not broadly hold the Corporation was not a state 
agency. It only acknowledged its governmental ties and 
creation as a "public" non-profit corporation. That case 
also did not involve the Archives and Records Services and 
Information Practices Act. 
No court, person or entity has ever declared the UTAH 
STATE BAR was not a state agency. (Defendants' Brief, p. 
6). 
This Court has the inherent power to regulate attorneys 
(admissions, practice & discipline) (Defendants' Brief, p. 
7; p. 9) (In re: Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1982). Specific power to do so is granted by the Utah 
Constitution. Art. VIII, § 4. The Court requires that a 
person be admitted to practice before the Utah Supreme Court 
in order to practice law in the State of Utah. The Utah 
Supreme Court, however, has extended itself beyond simply 
admitting attorneys to practice law and also requires, under 
penalty of prohibition of practice, that ail attorneys be 
members of the UTAH STATE BAR. 
The ability of the UTAH STATE BAR to be self-governing 
(Defendants' Brief, p. 7) is based upon exacting 
prescriptions from the Utah Supreme Court. The entire 
structure of the UTAH STATE BAR was established either by a 
Utah Supreme Court Rule or the Utah Legislature. That 
includes the powers of the Commissioners, their election and 
number, the right of the UTAH STATE BAR to hold and own 
property, qualifications to serve as a Commissioner, proce-
dure for election of Commissioners, requiring annual meet-
ings, the terms of service of Commissioners, granting the 
Commissioners the power to hire employees, specifying how 
Commissioners shall administer discipline, etc. Rules for 
Integration & Management of the UTAH STATE BAR, effective 
July 1, 1981. The UTAH STATE BAR was created in detail by 
two (2) governmental entities for the specific governmental 
purpose of regulating lawyers. 
The Supreme Court did not delegate powers to just any 
group (or to just any selected individual attorneys), the 
Supreme Court delegated the powers to an entity which it 
created. The Supreme Court can alter the power granted and 
completely control the UTAH STATE BAR through its rule 
making powers. For these reasons UTAH STATE BAR is a state 
agency. 
Delegation of Authority to An Agent 
The power to discipline and admit attorneys are powers 
delegated to the UTAH STATE BAR by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(Defendants' Brief, p. 9). 
The defendants on appeal now say: 
The fact that the [Utah] Supreme Court has chosen 
to delegate certain responsibilities with respect 
to the admission and discipline of the members of 
the Bar to the Bar itself. . . does not mean that 
the Bar itself is somehow transformed into a state 
agency for all purposes. [emphasis added] 
(Defendants1 Brief, p. 10) 
In the trial court, defendants said strongly and 
unequivocally: 
The fact that the supreme court has chosen to 
delegate certain responsibilities with respect to 
the admission and discipline of its members to the 
Bar itself does not somehow transform the Bar into 
a state agency. 
(T.Pw 110; Defendants1 Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment Motion, p. 7) 
Into what does such a delegation transform the UTAH STATE 
BAR? A simple application of the principles of master / 
servant and principal / agent law indicates that delegation 
of authority creates an agency. The Utah Supreme Court has 
some inherent responsibilities (like admitting attorneys to 
practice) and essentially says, "Let's have someone else do 
that for us, we're just too busy." There is no question 
that the person chosen is an agent of the Supreme Court. 
The same conclusion follows when the Supreme Court gives 
authority to the UTAH STATE BAR (even pretending that the 
UTAH STATE BAR had not been created by the Utah Supreme 
Court), The UTAH STATE BAR, acting for the Supreme Court, 
is a state agency. 
Assuming, as the defendants now suggest, that the UTAH 
STATE BAR is not a state agency for all purposes (Defen-
dants T Brief, p. 10), the defendants must concede that some 
disclosure under the Information Practices Act is required 
regarding some functions of the UTAH STATE BAR but not 
required as to other functions. The defendants make no 
suggestion as to when the Bar is or is not a state agency 
and when disclosure is or is not required. 
Since the source of power of the UTAH STATE BAR is 
either a legislative or judicial enactment, plaintiff 
suggests that for all. purposes the UTAH STATE BAR is a state 
agency. 
The Utah Supreme Court, itself, is a state agency 
covered by the Archives and Records Services and Information 
Practices Act because it is a "unit" "however designated," 
of the state, created by the Utah Constitution, and it is 
required to comply with the Act. The Supreme Court could 
not evade its responsibility to comply with the Act by 
delegating authority or creating a new entity to serve the 
bidding of the Court.* 
* Defendants suggest that if the UTAH STATE BAR is really a 
state agency then compliance with the Governmental Immunity 
Act (Ut. Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and § 63-30-12 (1953 as 
amended)) was required in this case. That is incorrect 
because a separate cause of action is created by the Utah 
Information Practices Act which does not require any notice 
II. 
THE ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICES and 
INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT 
APPLIES TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
The Archives and Records Services and Information 
Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as 
amended), applies to "public records" maintained by public 
offices, agencies and institutions of the state of Utah, 
including the UTAH STATE BAR. See definition of public 
office or state agency contained in Ut. Code Ann. § 
63-2-61(2) (1953 as amended). UTAH STATE BAR officers are 
public officials under the Archives and Records Services and 
Information Act and wage information as to employees of the 
UTAH STATE BAR constitute public records under that act. 
Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (1) & (10) (1953 as amended). 
Because information as to salaries paid employees of 
state agencies and institutions is "public data" and avail-
able for public inspection, Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-61 (1) & 
(10) (1953 as amended); Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 
1194 (Utah 1980); Minutes of State Records Committee, July 
28, 1977 cited by Redding, wage and salary information of 
UTAH STATE BAR employees is "public data" and must be 
available to the public. The UTAH STATE BAR must comply 
with the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 
as amended) regarding wage and salary information of its 
staff, and its failure to provide the plaintiff with specif-
ic salary information concerning its staff violates Ut. Code 
Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended). 
The applicability of the Archives and Records Services 
and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et 
seq (1953 as amended), to the defendants is clear from a 
reading of the Act. That statute (§ 63-2-61(2)) defines a 
"state agency" very broadly as a department, division, 
board, bureau, commission, council, institution, authority, 
or other unit, however designated, of the state. The UTAH 
STATE BAR, is an arm of this Court (Defendants1 Brief, p. 
11; p. 14) and a creature of the state, and therefore is a 
"unit" of the state "however designated." 
The Information Practice Act (§ 63-2-61(3)) defines 
"public offices" and "public officers" to mean, respective-
ly, the offices and officers of any court, commission or 
other agency of the state. Contrary to the absurd sug-
gestion of the defendants (Defendantsr Brief, p. 10), the 
plaintiff does not want this Court to interpret the term 
"officers of any court" to mean all attorneys; the logical 
reading of that provision covers the clerks of a court, the 
administrators of a court, the secretarial employees of a 
court, and paid functionaries of a court, etc. This reading 
follows from the broad definition of "state agency" 
(§ 63-2-61(2)) and is consistent with the statute 
(§ 63-2-79) which specifically authorizes the state 
archivist to assist the judicial branch of state government 
with regard to records-management programs and the provision 
of program services under the Act. 
Redding v. Brady 
The defendants say that Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1980), does not apply because Weber State College was 
clearly a ffpublic institution11 since it received tax payers' 
money, (Defendants1 Brief, p. 9) Whether an entity re-
ceives tax payers1 money is one indicator as to whether it 
is a "state agency," but it is not conclusive. The R.ed 
Cross and other charitable groups regularly receive tax 
payers1 money, but they are not "state agencies.11 Defen-
dants cite no authority for their suggestion (Defendants' 
Brief, p. 9) that simply because the UTAH STATE BAR does not 
receive public tax payer money it is not a state agency. 
In Redding, Weber State College was determined to be a 
state institution for reasons other than its receipt of 
taxpayer money, just as the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency 
despite its non-receipt of public tax payer money. In part, 
the UTAH STATE BAR is a state agency because of its receipt 
of attorney "taxes" in the form of state mandated fees. 
Weber State College was and is a "public institution" 
because it was created and perpetuated by enactment of the 
Utah Legislature, Ut. Code Ann. § 53B-2-101 (1953 as amend-
ed), just like the UTAH STATE BAR. And just like the UTAH 
STATE BAR, Weber State College serves a governmentally 
mandated function: providing higher education vs. regulat-
ing attorneys. The UTAH STATE BAR like Weber State College 
is a state agency for many reasons other than just receiving 
and spending tax money. 
Privacy v. Public's Right to Know 
This Court acknowledged in Redding v. Brady, that there 
is a "right to privacy11 in Utah. Redding, 606 P. 2d 1193, 
1195. That right however is limited to items of very 
personal nature and is determined ffby applying the commonly 
accepted standards of social propriety.11 Id. , 1195. This 
Court then weighed that right to privacy of the employees of 
Weber State College against "the right of the public to know 
what goes on in its public institutions.11 Id. , 1195. 
Balancing the two competing interests, this Court said, 
Inasmuch as the very existence of public insti-
tutions depends upon finances provided by the 
public, it does not strike us as being discordant 
to reason that the public would want to know, and 
ought to know how their money is spent. In regard 
to the defendant's expressed fears that the 
exposure of such information will have an adverse 
effect upon its ability to operate the College, it 
seems to us that there is even a greater potential 
for evil in permitting public funds to be expended 
secretly. In this connection it is also to be 
realized that by accepting employment at the 
college its employees are not merely private 
citizens, but become public servants in whose 
conduct and in whose salary the public has a 
legitimate interest. 
Id. , 1196; See discussion: "Dev. In Utah Law," 1980 Ut. Law 
Rev. 649, 662-664. 
Thus, this Court ruled that any privacy right that a 
governmental employee might have against the disclosure of 
the amount of her salary is outweighed by the public's right 
to know how the public's money is spent. That decision 
applies to the employees of the UTAH STATE BAR who are 
public servants paid with "taxes,ff in the form of mandatory 
dues from Utah attorneys. 
In Redding, this Court noted "the public would want to 
know, and ought to know how their money is spent" (Id., 
1196). In the case at bar we have a situation where the fee 
payer, (the plaintiff and other members of the UTAH STATE 
BAR), also want to know, and ought to know how his/her money 
is spent. 
The defendants acknowledge that "taxpayer vs. Weber 
State College" in Redding is different than "Bar Member vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR" in the case before the Court. (Defendants1 
Brief, p. 9). The plaintiff's position is that the facts 
here are much more compelling and there are stronger reasons 
for disclosure in this case than in Redding. The almost 
five thousand (4,900+) attorneys in Utah, each forced to be 
a member of the UTAH STATE BAR, are "taxed" directly and 
specifically to pay the salaries of the employees of the 
UTAH STATE BAR. There are fewer "tax payers" in this case 
and they have a greater need to have their money accounted 
for. Additionally, the elected governing board of the UTAH 
STATE BAR. are all lawyers who have a fiduciary duty owed to 
the members of the UTAH STATE BAR to explicitly show that 
every cent they extract from attorneys is properly spent. 
This gives every Utah attorney greater reason and a more 
compelling need to know how his/her money is being used. 
Bar members want to know and ought to know how their money 
is spent. The UTAH STATE BAR makes regular fiscal reports 
to the Utah Supreme Court. (Supp. T.R. ; Sec. Aff. of 
Hutchinson, September 8, 1988, pp. 3-4, If 2 - f 3). 
Shouldn't the UTAH STATE BAR also be accountable to its 
involuntary individual members who pay dues? 
Once this Court determines that the UTAH STATE BAR is a 
state agency, Redding applies, and the wage and salary 
information requested must be provided. 
III. 
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WRITINGS ACT 
APPLIES TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
The Public and Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 78-26-2 (1953 as amended) provides in pertinent part: 
Right to Inspect and Copy -- Every citizen 
has a right to inspect and take a copy of any 
public writing of this state except as 
otherwise expressly provided by statute. 
The UTAH STATE BAR must comply with the Public and Private 
Writings Act by divulging to the plaintiff wage and salary 
information concerning its staff. The plaintiff does not 
seek any personally identifiable financial information such 
as tax withholding information, number of dependents, etc. 
but only the gross salaries and fringe benefits provided to 
employees of the UTAH STATE BAR. 
The defendants concede that if the UTAH STATE BAR is a 
state agency the Utah Public and Private Writings Act 
applies and disclosure of the information requested by 
plaintiff is mandated. (Defendants1 Brief, p. 6) 
As set forth above, the UTAH STATE BAR is a state 
agency and, therefore, the defendants violated the Public 
and Private Writings Act by refusing to provide the plain-
tiff with specific salary information for employees of the 
UTAH STATE BAR. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
The plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages for the 
above described violation, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended).** The defendants refusal 
to provide the requested information is a willful violation 
of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended). 
The Utah legislature mandates exemplary damages be 
awarded for violations of a member of the public's right to 
access to "public data." The defendants1 conduct herein is 
the type of violation the legislature intended to punish. 
The UTAH STATE BAR, of all public entities in the state 
of Utah acting as an arm of this Court serving a constitu-
tionally mandated function, should be concerned with conply-
** A violation of the Archives and Records Services and 
Information Practices Act is serious mis-conduct. The Act 
provides for criminal sanctions and declares a violation of 
the act a class B misdemeanor, and providing that a public 
employee who willfully violates the act is subject to 
suspension without pay or discharge. Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-87 (1953 as amended). 
ing with the law and remaining open to the public. Its 
willful refusal to comply with Utah laws designed to insure 
lawful and open conduct, justifies imposition of punitive 
damages as allowed by law. 
The District Court's ruling simply recited in a 
conclusory fashion that the defendants' violation of the 
Information Practices Act was not willful. (T.R. 143-146; 
Summary Judgment, May 9, 1988, p. 2) That finding was made 
on the basis of affidavits which showed the defendants did 
not comply with the statute solely because of their inter-
pretation that the law was not applicable to them; clearly, 
the process of making that interpretation was willful. The 
lack of adequate findings of fact regarding the willful 
nature of the defendants' conduct and exemplary damages 
precludes an adequate review by this Court. 
V. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees and is 
entitled to re-imbursement thereof pursuant to the pro-
visions of Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as amended). 
Re-imbursement for fees does not require, as does an 
award of exemplary damages, a willful violation of the 
Archives and Records Services and Information Practices Act. 
Thus, even for non-willful violations of the Act, the 
plaintiff is entitled to re-imbursement for attorney's fees. 
The trial court, although finding in favor of plain-
tiff, refused to award attorney fees as per Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-88(1) (1953 as amended). That statute states in 
pertinent part: 
Any responsible authority who violates any provision of 
this act shall be liable to any person, suffering 
damage as a result thereof, and the person damaged nay 
bring an action to recover any damages . . . and 
reasonable attorney fees." [emphasis added] Id. 
The import of the statutory language is that the 
violating authority will be liable for attorney fees to the 
person damaged by the violation of the statute. The use of 
the word shall leaves no room for discretion as to whether 
liability exists as to attorney fees. If the statute is 
violated there is liability as to attorney fees, as well as 
costs and damages. The fact that plaintiff exercised his 
right and brought an action against the Bar and the fact 
that the Bar was found to be in violation of the statute 
necessarily requires an award of attorney fees. 
Inasmuch as the language of the statute allows no 
discretion to the trial court concerning the award of fees, 
a refusal to award them must be accompanied by findings 
explaining the court's reasons and basis for not following 
the law. Futhermore, if the award of attorney fees were a 
question of fact and an exercise of discretion by the trial 
court, in order to examine that discretion, findings of fact 
from the trial court are necessary. This court must find 
the trial court's decision to deny fees erroneous since it 
is contrary to law and is unaccompanied by findings. 
This Court should remand this matter with instructions 
to award attorney fees as required by statute. 
VI. 
DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT RE: UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE STATUTES SHOULD BE IGNORED 
Defendants1 Brief (pp. 11-14) suggests that the 
statutes, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended) 
and Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 as amended) which 
formed the basis of the decision of the Court below, cannot 
be constitutionally applied to the UTAH STATE BAR. The gist 
of that argument is that the UTAH STATE BAR is an arm of the 
Utah Supreme Court and, under the separation of powers 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, the legislature cannot, 
through statutes, tell the Utah Supreme Court, and its 
agent, the UTAH STATE BAR, how to conduct its functions. 
This argument appears for the first time in the Appel-
lants1 Brief (§ II, p. 2, % 2) in the STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. This claim and argument is not 
mentioned in the Issues on Appeal portion (K 5) of the 
defendants-appellants' Docketing Statement (May 26, 1988). 
The argument was not raised in the defendants-appellants1 
Memorandum (dated April 14, 1988) in Opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment before the lower 
court. T.R. 104-111 The argument was not raised in the 
defendants-appellants' Answer (dated February 29, 1988). 
T.R. 48-50 At no time while this action was before the 
District Court was the claim or argument of "unconstitu-
tionality" raised. This claim was neither briefed nor 
argued before the District Court. Thus, the trial court was 
not requested to, nor was it able to, rule on that claim and 
defense. 
Having failed to present this claim and argument to the 
Court below, the appellants-defendants are now precluded 
from presenting the argument to this Court for the first 
time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
App. 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Lane 
v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Bangerter v. 
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). 
VII. 
APPLICATION OF THE INFORMATION PRACTICES ACT 
AND THE PUBLIC WRITINGS ACT 
TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONCEPT 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The defendants express concern that the legislature 
should not be allowed, through statutes, to control what 
information the UTAH STATE BAR is required to divulge since 
the Bar is an arm of the judiciary and the judiciary must 
not be controlled by the legislature. In reality, the 
judiciary is, in many instances, controlled by statutes. 
The Bar itself was originally ordered created by the legis-
lature, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-51-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
The legislature has also required the courts to conduct all 
proceedings in English, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-22 (1953 as 
amended); established the parameters of contempt Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-32-1 et seq. (1953 as amended); established 
judicial salaries, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-8-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended) and established the powers of every judicial 
officer, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17 (1953 as amended),* 
The effect of application of these statutes to the UTAH 
STATE BAR is not so great as to offend the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Application of these statutes is also 
appropriate since the UTAH STATE BAR has not enacted any 
rules regarding disclosure and accountability to its mem-
bers , and has enacted no rules to protect the privacy 
(within permissible parameters) of its employees or its 
members. 
Cases Cited by Defendants 
In their brief defendants cite Huntsman - Christensen 
Corp. v. Entrada Industries, 639 F.Supp. 733 (D.Utah 1986) 
to support their contention that Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2) 
* The Utah legislature through numerous other statutes 
exercises control over the judiciary. Some of them are: 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) §§ 78-7-1 (conflicts of 
interest), 78-7-18 (power to punish contempt), 78-7-9.5 
(service of a judge in another division or court), 77-35-29 
(disability of judges), 77-35-29 (judicial bias or preju-
dice) , 78-34-8 (powers of judge concerning eminent domain), 
78-7-16 (judicial powers out of court), 30-3-17 (powers and 
jurisdiction of family courts), 78-7-27 (appointment of 
judicial conduct committee), 78-2-1 (number of justices, 
selection and functions), 78-2-2 (Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion) , 78-7-30 (privileged nature of complaints and testimo-
ny) , 78-7-28 (involuntary retirement of judges), 20-1-7.1 
(process for filling vacancies). 
(1953 as amended) is limited in its scope and that it is up 
to the courts to decide on a case by case basis whether the 
right to information is outweighed by competing interests. 
The court in Huntsman however, was dealing with formal court 
documents not records of employee salaries. Obviously there 
is a great difference between court documents and records of 
governmental employee salaries. The courts should, as 
stated "have discretion to seal court documents." Id. at 
736. The case at bar has nothing to do with court docu-
ments. The court in Huntsman noted a common law presumption 
favoring public access to judicial records. Id. at 737. 
Unless there is good reason to seal files and make secret 
their contents, even formal court documents should be open 
to the public. Id. 
Defendants further cite Pasik v. State Board of Law 
Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. 1984). The case is not 
applicable here because it was decided solely on the basis 
of the New York Freedom of Information Law. That statute is 
unique to New York state. An attempt to apply it in Utah is 
pointless. 
Finally, defendants cite, Matter of Washington State 
Bar Assoc., 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976) and Ex Parte Auditor 
of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980). There are 
clear distinctions between those cases and the case at bar. 
In both cited cases the legislative branch was a party to a 
suit against the state bar attempting to audit the bars1 
records in search of malfeasance. In the instant case, 
plaintiff is an active, dues-paying member of the Bar who 
simply wishes to know the salaries of the Bar employees. 
This case is not an instance of one branch of state govern-
ment attempting to interfere with another, it is analogous 
to a taxpayer seeking information pertaining to salaries 
paid to state employees. 
VIII. 
NO RULE PROHIBITS DISCLOSURE 
Interestingly, there is no rule of the UTAH STATE BAR 
or of the Utah Supreme Court which prohibits the release of 
the requested salary information. (If there was, the 
defendants would have have cited it!). Below, the defen-
dants asserted the plaintiff should have asked for the 
enactment of a new administrative rule to "release" the 
salary information. (T.R. 49; Answer, SECOND AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE, p. 2) The converse is true, the defendants could 
enact (or could have enacted) an administrative rule 
prohibiting the release. Absent such a rule, the 
information must be released.** 
** The defendants have adopted no rule that allows them to 
disclose salary ranges (in lieu of specific salaries for 
specific employees) as they provided in the initial response 
to plaintiff's request for salary information. Defendants 
adopted an ad hoc practice in this regard but only after 
plaintiff inquired as to the salaries. 
IX. 
DEFENDANTS' FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE SHOULD BE STRIKEN 
The defendants1 Fifth Affirmative Defense in their 
Answer (T.R. pp. 49-50) recites: 
Plaintiff has brought this action for 
the purpose of harassing the Defendants 
in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The defendants submitted no evidence to support this 
allegation/defense. There are no facts to support such a 
claim. (T.R. passim) 
This defense accuses the plaintiff, an attorney, of 
unethical and/or improper conduct in three (3) regards: 
A violation of former DR 7-102(A)(l) 
which provided that a lawyer may not ff[f]ile 
a suit. . . when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely 
to harass or maliciously injure another.1' 
A violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in filing an action not 
well grounded in law or in fact and filed for 
an improper purpose. 
A violation of Rule 3.1 of the current 
Rules of Professional Conduct in that plain-
tiff brought a frivolous or meritless pro-
ceeding. 
Such accusations of improper conduct are inappropriate in av 
answer and are exceptionally offensive when made without any 
basis in fact. 
In the Court below, Judge Wilkinson ruled in favor of 
the plaintiff, thus determining that the action was not 
frivolous. (T.R. pp. 143-146) Thereafter, plaintiff 
requested that the defendants' counsel voluntarily strike 
their Fifth Affirmative Defense, as offensive and without 
merit. They have declined to do so. 
A claimed violation under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is not a defense to be raised in an Answer. 
A violation of Rule 11 should be raised by motion or upon 
the court's own initiative, and may result in sanctions. To 
include a request for Rule 11 sanctions in an Answer is 
premature; it must await a determination, usually upon 
motion of the impropriety of the pleading. A request for 
Rule 11 sanctions is not provided for in Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which deals with answers and 
defenses. 
Plaintiff requests this Court to enter an order strik-
ing defendants1 Fifth Affirmative Defense as a violation of 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, as 
an improper and insufficient defense, and impertinent and 
scandalous matter, this Court should order that Defense 
striken under Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
CONCLUSION 
The UTAH STATE BAR must comply with the provisions of 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 
as amended) regarding wage and salary information of its 
employees. The "tax paying" members of the UTAH STATE BAR 
have the right to know how and where their money is being 
spent. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and 
permanent injunctive relief, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-88 (3) (1953 as amended), requiring compliance with 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 63-2-59 et seq and §§ 78-26-1 et seq (1953 
as amended) and the disclosure of salary and wage informa-
tion of UTAH STATE BAR employees. 
Application of those statutes to the UTAH STATE BAR 
does not offend the doctrine of separation of powers. 
No rule or regulation of the UTAH STATE BAR or of this 
Court prohibits the disclosure of the requested information. 
The plaintiff should be awarded, pursuant to Ut. Code 
Ann. § 63-2-88 (2) (1953 as amended), exemplary damages for 
the defendants' willful violation of Ut. Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-59 et seq (1953 as amended). 
The plaintiff must be awarded attorney fees pursuant to 
the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. § 63-2-88 (1) (1953 as 
amended). 
Defendants' Fifth Affirmative Defense should be 
striken. 
The appeal by the defendants should be denied and the 
decision of the trial court should be affirmed as to the 
award of summary judgment to the plaintiff. 
The cross-appeal of the plaintiff should be granted and 
the matter should be remanded with direction to the trial 
court to award exemplary damages as well as attorney fees, 
including those incurred on appeal against the defendants, 
DATED this 4th day of NOVEMBER, 1988. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
by \j \Al4\\\__\ /L\K , C U 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
C. DANE NOLAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-88-0578 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Hon. H. WILKINSON ) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court 
for hearing on the Motion of the Plaintiff for Summary 
Judgment and on the Motion of the Plaintiff for Judgment on 
the Pleadings, the hearing being heLd pursuant to notice on 
April 22, 1988 at 9:00 a.m., the Hon. Homer Wilkinson, judge 
presiding, the plaintiff appearing by and through counsel, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, the defendants appearing by and through 
their counsel, RICHARD BURBIDGE, the Court having reviewed 
the file and the pleadings therein and having heard the 
representations and arguments of respective counsel, based 
thereon and for good cause appearing, 
^:PU\ INTIPPS^1 
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/fern/6?. 9/Ty 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be and hereby 
is granted; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the UTAH STATE 
BAR is determined to be a "state agency" as defined in, and 
is subject to, the provisions of the Utah Archives and 
Records Services and Information Practices Act, Ut. Code 
Ann. §§ 63-2-59 (1953 as amended) and the Utah Public and 
Private Writings Act, Ut. Code Ann, §§ 78-26-2 et seq (1953 
as amended); the case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193, 
(Ut. 1980) is controlling in this action; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief as against the 
defendants pursuant, in part, to the provisions of Ut. Code 
Ann. § 63-2-88 (3) (1953 as amended); further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendants shall comply with the provisions of the aforesaid 
:-M.:.(::;, and shall provide to the plaintiff specific wage, 
sal.ary and benefit information regarding the employees of 
the Utah State Bar; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the refusal of 
tin', defendants to comply with the Information Practices Act 
was not willful and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled 
to exemplary damages; further, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees in 
this action; further, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff should be and hereby is awarded his costs in the 
sum of eighty-four dollars and ninety cents ($84.90) based 
upon the plaintiff's memorandum of costs date April 22. 1988 
and pursuant to Rule 54 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4 
v4A., DATED this _/_ day of JCp*i£  1988 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER WILKINSON 
JUDGE 
flv -' 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
C. DANE NOLAN USB # 4891 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111 - 3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, Civil No. C-88-0578 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
: PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE 
UTAH STATE BAR and OF CROSS APPEAL 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON, : 
Defendants. (Hon. H. WILKINSON ) 
THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through counsel 
hereby gives notice of a Cross Appeal in the above matter. 
This appeal is based upon the denial of exemplary damages 
against the defendants and the denial of attorney fees as 
against the defendants in the ruling and summary judgment of 
the Court dated and signed May 9, 1988. 
The defendants have already filed a notice of appeal in 
this matter dated May 18, 1988. 
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this 18th day of MAY, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of MAY, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL to: 
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE 
Counsel for Defendants 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD BURBIDGE & STEPHEN MITCHELL 
Counsel for Defendants 
139 East South Temple # 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CARMAN E. KIPP & ROBERT REES 
Counsel for Defendants 
175 East 400 South #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-9331 -528-9532 
Attorneys 
Co Dane Nolan 
Brian M. Barnard 
November 6, 1987 
STEVE HUTCHINSON 
Executive Director 
Utah State Bar 
A25 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Expenditures of the Utah State Bar For Salary. 
Dear Mr. Hutchinson: 
I would appreciate it if you could provide me with some 
information with regard to the salaries paid to the various 
positions at the Utah State Bar. 
I noted in the Utah State Bar, 1986 annual report, an 
item under expenses for "salary and personnel costs11 in the 
sum of $376,461.00. The comparable figure for 1985 was 
$337,498.00. 
In looking back at the proposed budget for the fiscal 
year 1980-1981, I noticed that the combined figures for 
salaries, payroll taxes and fringe benefits was only 
$158,000.00. 
I would appreciate seeing how those figures for 1986 
compare to the figures for 1987 and I'd like to see how 
those salaried personnel costs break down for each of the 
executive and major staff positions within the Bar. 
I'm also very interested in what kind of fringe 
benefits are being provided to the staff of the Utah State 
Bar; by that I mean annual leave, sick leave, retirement, 
etc. 
Thank you for 
cc: Reed Martineau 
T*M"R/*-1« 
your cooperatiqnand a t t en t io 
PLAINTIFF'S 
Utah Legal Clink 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-9531-328-9532 
December 11f 1987 
STEPHEN F. HUTCHINSON 
Executive Director 
UTAH STATE BAR 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: SALARY & WAGE INFORMATION 
Employees of Utah State Bar 
Dear Mr, Hutchinson: 
Thank you for your letter of December 9, 1987. 
In response to a letter I sent in 1980, (similar to my 
recent request to you) I received the enclosed letter and 
attachment from Barbara Bassett. As you will note she was 
able to provide me with very specific information regarding 
the salaries of employees of the Utah State Bar. 
I would like similar information for the years 1986-
1987 and 1987-1988. 
Thank you for your assistance and cooperation. 
pdq/BMB 
cc: Reed Martineau, Esq. 
Attorneys 
C. Dane Nolan 
Brian M. Barnard 
PLAINTIFF'S 
• p y u m i T ;:&• 
UTAH STATE BAR 
4 2 5 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
July 14, 1980 
Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq, 
214 East 500 So. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dear Brian 
Carman E. Kipp 
President 
GOO Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84U1 
521-3773 
Duane A. Frandsen 
President Elect 
90 West 100 North 
Price. Utah 84501 
637-1245 
Dean W. Sheffield 
Executive Director 
425 East 100 South 
Sail Lake City, Utah S4U1 
531-9077 
Commissioners 
Stephen Ho Anderson 
Brian R. Florence 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Norman S, Johnson 
O. Wood Moyle III 
Gordon L. Roberts 
David W. Sorenson 
Enclosed is the salary information you requested on employees of 
the State Bar Office. 
If you have any questions, or I may be of further assistance, please 
call. 
irbara R. Bassett 
BRBfljc 
f PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 1 
UTAH STATE BAR 
SALARY SCHEDULE 
TITLE 
Executive Director 
Assistant to Executive Director 
Secretary to Executive Director 
Bar Counsel 
Secretary to Bar Counsel 
Bookkeeper/Licensing Clerk 
Lawyer Referral Clerk 
Receptionist 
Mail Room Clerk 
MONTHLY 
3,210.00 
925.00 
850.00 
1,666.66 
925.00 
400.00 
750.00 
700.00 
4.50/hr. 
YEARLY 
38,520.00 
11,100.00 
10,200.00 
19,999.92 
11,100.00 
4,800.00 
9,000.00 
8,400.00 
8,640.00 
121,759.92 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of NOVEMBER, 1988, 
I caused to be mailed two (2) copies of the above and 
foregoing pleading BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT and RESPONDENT 
to each of the following: 
CARMAN E. KIPP, Esq. 
ROBERT H. REES, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
175 East 400 South # 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
139 East South Temple # 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and 
JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Cross-Respondents 
425 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
counsel for the opposing parties, postage prepaid in the 
United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Cross-Appellant & 
Respondeat 
by yVVaW^^-X jfRx. 
C. DANE NOLAN 
